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In Austin et al. v. Goodbar Shoe Co., the Supreme Court of
Arkansas holds that the failure to file an attachment bond is a per-
sonal right of the defendant which cannot be asserted by a
stranger to the suit. This decision follows Banta v. Reynolds,
which reverses the former decisions in Kentucky. There is a
statute in that State similar to one in Mississippi, which declares
judgments in attachment, where no attachment bond has been
filed, void. Previous to Banta v. Reynolds the statute had been
strictly applied and such judgments set aside upon the motion of
strangers to the suit. But in this case the court held that the
expression in the statute making such judgments void was incau-
tiously inserted, and the word "void" should be understood
synonymously with "voidable "-that is "to be rendered void on
pleading." Two supplementary decisions in South Carolina
supporting Banta v. Reynolds may be noted. Wagner v. Bookey
held that such failure to file bond was a jurisdictional error, and
upon the motion of the defendant the judgment was set aside.
While Camberford v. Hall held that a garnishee could not take
advantage of any error or irregularities in the proceeding against
the absent debtor. The filing of a bond is for the protection of
the debtor. If it is not filed, the debtor may take advantage of
the error or irregularity or he may waive it. A judgment made
by a court of competent jurisdiction may be erroneous where
such irregularity exists, but it is not void, and remains until
arrested or reversed. It cannot be set aside except at the instance
of the defendant.
In Seeley v. Hicks et al.; Executors (65 Conn.), the testator in
a codicil to his will provided that should his grandson render such
services to his estate as to satisfy a committee of three, the execu-
tors should pay him a certain sum. At the decease of the testa-
tor the grandson notified both the committee and the executors
that he was ready to do whatever he could, and demanded an
opportunity to render services. The executors refused to employ
him, and as he had rendered no actual services the committee
refused to give the executors a certificate of satisfaction. There
were two conditions attached to the benefit conferred-one
to faithfully devote his personal attention and services to the
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estate, the other that such attention and services should suffi-
ciently satisfy the committee. Quoting from Redfield on Wills,
Vol. II., page 283, the Court said: "Where the condition is in the
nature of a consideration for the concession, its performance will
be regarded as intended to precede the vesting of any right, and
so a condition precedent." The plaintiff, therefore, could take
nothing until the conditions were fulfilled, or that done which in
law, or within the expressed intent of the testator, was equivalent
thereto. The general rule concerning conditions precedent is,
"that conditions precedent must be fulfilled before the legacy
vests, and the fact that the beneficiary is not at fault makes no
difference." Redfield on Wills, Vol. II., page 284; Johnson v.
Warren, 74 Mich. 491. To this rule there is this exception:
"Where a testator confers a benefit upon a condition to be per-
formed to or for the benefit of his estate, or to, or in favor of
some third party and in his will manifests an intent to dispense
with its performance when it is prevented by those having charge
of his estate, or by such third party." Page v. Frazier's Execu-
tors, 14 Bush. 205. In such a case the benefit takes effect though
the condition is not performed, because it is the intent of the
testator. If, then, it was the duty of the executors to employ the
plaintiff their conduct in refusing so to do prevented the fulfill-
ment of the conditions. It was the intent of the testator that the
executors give the plaintiff an opportunity to fulfill the conditions
attached, for he left the power to defeat the gift in the plaintiff
and the committee, and in no one else. The court rendered
judgment that the committee perform the duty imposed upon it
by the codicil just as if the plaintiff had actually rendered services
to the estate.
The difference in effect of an absolute divorce and dissolution
of a marriage upon the status of the parties has been illustrated
in the interesting case of State v. Duket, 63 N. W. Rep. 83, decided
by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which contains several com-
plications. A statute of that State provides that sentence of
imprisonment for life shall dissolve the marriage of the person
sentenced, without any judgment of divorce or other legal process,
and that no pardon shall restore the person to his conjugal rights
The constitution forbids the granting of any divorce by the legis-
lature. One French had been sentenced to jail for life, and his
wife took advantage of the statute and married again, while pro-
ceedings for a new trial were pending. The new trial was
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granted, and the validity of the wife's marriage came in question.
The lower court held it void, on the ground that the sentence had
been illegal, and could not operate to change the status of the
accused. The case was appealed, and the Supreme Court first
considered the intent of the constitutional provision. They
decided that the words must be construed with reference to the
mischiefs at which they were aimed-the promiscuous granting of
divorces by special acts-and that they did not limit the power of
the legislature to enact just and proper laws affecting all persons
alike in the matrimonial state. The law merely provided a gen-
eral consequence attendant upon the life sentence of any married
person, and did not authorize the granting of any divorce. The
court held further that "the law was self-executing, and did not
suspend the marriage relation, but extinguished it; so that the
reversal of the sentence could not operate to restore the parties to
their former relations, as in the case of reversal of a valid judg-
ment of divorce." This case suggests several questions which
might arise under such a law. Suppose French to be acquitted
on his second trial, and released. Would the injury caused him
by the operation of the statute enable him to recover damages
from the State for the loss of his wife's services? Or, in case his
wife had preferred that the matrimonial relation between herself
and her husband should continue after his imprisonment for life,
it would appear unjust to dissolve it absolutely, against her will.
The fault is plainly not with the court, but with the law, which is
too sweeping. If a life sentence were merely made ground for an
absolute divorce, it would be more consonant with justice and
public policy.
The case of Gwin v. Barton, 6 How. 7, held that the Process
Act of 1828, which required that the modes of procedure in the
courts of the United States should conform as near as possible to
the State law, did not adopt a State law inflicting penalties upon
ministerial officers for failure to perform their duty. In Zeak
Glove MArfg. Co. v. Needles, 69 Fed. Rep. 68, the circuit court has
decided that this doctrine has no effect where a State law has been
adopted by act of Congress, for the government of the Indian
Territory. The law has the same force in the Territory as an
original act of Congress, without reference to its origin. It seems
that in adopting the law for the Territory, the construction pre-
viously placed upon it by the State courts is to be followed, just
as though it were the Federal courts which had passed upon it.
